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A B S T R A C T
The management and understanding of modal split between public transport (PT) modes is of interest for nu-
merous reasons. It may, for example, be desirable to stimulate passengers to switch from crowded buses and over
to higher capacity rail. This requires a good understanding of drivers of transit modal substitution.
The evidence put forward in this paper is based on more than 150 empirically estimated cross elasticities
between PT modes from over 20 sources collected from Australia, Europe and USA. These sources include sci-
entifically published evidence as well as grey literature.
This evidence is coded into a database from which our paper presents and analyses the available cross-PT-
modal demand relations. We focus on evidence for how fares, travel time and service intervals on PT ‘mode A’
affect the demand for PT ‘mode B’.
Despite generally low levels of substitution between PT modes, passengers are particularly sensitive to in-
vehicle, access/egress and waiting time in choosing PT mode and less so for fare variations. In general, rail
demand is less sensitive to changes in bus than bus demand is to changes in rail. We also find that peak-hour
demand more markedly switches between PT modes than off-peak demand does.
1. Introduction
Within public transport (PT) systems there may, for various reasons,
be of interest to better understand the dynamics of demand between PT
modes, for example what happens to bus demand when metro services
improve. Such knowledge may guide policymakers who seek to shift
passenger flows away from overcrowded buses and onto higher capa-
city rail modes, as in Oslo (Ruter, 2015) or the other way round to
encourage shifts from crowded metro systems and over to buses, which
may be a goal for transit systems like London's (BBC, 2006; Grayling &
Glaister, 2000). The planning for and handling of unplanned disrup-
tions and strikes would also benefit from improved knowledge of modal
substitution between PT modes (Nguyen-Phuoc, Currie, De Gruyter, &
Young, 2017a; Nguyen-Phuoc, Currie, De Gruyter, & Young, 2017b). On
a higher level, better understanding of the level and aspects of com-
petition between PT modes can help improve competition legislation
and inform the many countries that still protect their heavy rail lines
from competition with express coaches (Aarhaug & Fearnley, 2016;
Augustin, Gerike, Sanchez, & Ayala, 2014; Beria, Grimaldi, Debernardi,
Ferrara, & Laurino, 2014; Van de Velde, 2009; Walter, Haunerland, &
Moll, 2011). In deregulated PT markets with free entry, evidence of key
dimensions of intra-PT modal competition would be a competitive ad-
vantage for incumbents and potential entrants alike.
A key indicator of competition between PT modes is the cross
elasticity of demand (hereafter εij), which is the demand effect on mode
i when an attribute of mode j is changed marginally – for example the
effect on demand for bus with respect to metro fares; if this
cross elasticity of demand is, for example 0.2, one would expect
that a 1 percent increase in metro fares increases bus demand by
0.2 percent.
Cross elasticities of demand are relevant, although controversial,1
indicators of competition also in the legal sense of competition law. In
order for competition regulators and courts to define the ‘relevant
market’, evidence of cross-price elasticities is sometimes used to sup-
port SSNIP test (Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price).
Following Dodgson (1986) and provided that PT modes are
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substitutes, cross-elasticities of demand, εij, depend crucially on 1) own-
elasticity of demand, εjj; 2) the two modes’ relative market shares, Qj/
Qi; and 3) diversion factors, δji, which is a relative measure of the de-
mand change in mode i compared to the demand change of mode j. The
relationship can be written as,
= Q
Qij ij
j
i
ji (1)
It is clear from this formula that the cross-elasticity of demand for
mode i with respect to an attribute of mode j is larger the larger mode j's
own elasticity is, the larger market share mode j has relative to mode i,
and the higher diversion is from mode j to mode i.
The relative market shares and the diversion factor will typically
differ considerably between areas (see, e.g. Dunkerley, Wardman, Rohr,
& Fearnley, forthcoming). Even within areas there may be large differ-
ences depending on, e.g., trip purpose, time of day, detailed location
relative to various PT modes’ stops and stations, and so on. It follows
that cross elasticities of demand are particularly context dependent, and
much more so than own-elasticities of demand whose levels show a
remarkably high level of stability.2
Fig. 1 shows the relative share of transit modes in world cities and
also for world regions of cities, drawing on data from UITP
(2001;2015). In cities at the top of the figures, bus totally dominates
over other PT modes. Here, a shift of only a small percentage of pas-
sengers from bus over to other PT modes would represent a large per-
centage increase in those other PT modes. At the bottom end of the
figures, where bus has a relative minor role, the transfer of the same
small percentage bus passengers over to other PT modes would re-
present a far less increase on those PT modes. This illustrates quite well
the importance of context when analysing cross elasticities of demand.
1.1. World cities
While Dodgson's cross-elasticity formulation in equation (1) relies
on deduction based on known (or assumed) parameters, the general
specification of cross-elasticity of demand, assuming demand for mode i
is a differentiable function of an attribute (P) of mode j, is,
= dQ
dP
P
Qij
i
j
j
i (2)
The demand elasticities literature draws a line between “condi-
tional” and “unconditional” demand elasticities (Balcombe et al.,
2004). “Conditional” means that the elasticity estimate is conditional
upon a similar attribute change across all those attributes. E.g. all fares
change by X % (and not just the price of one ticket type, like the single
ticket price), or alternatively that all PT fares in an area change by the
same percentage (and not just of one of the PT modes). “Unconditional”
elasticity estimates, on the other hand relax this assumption and implies
that a change in an attribute (e.g. price of monthly travel card) can be
the only change (other ticket prices do not change) taking place. Since
the barriers to switching between ticket types or, to some extent, be-
tween PT modes are typically regarded as less strong than barriers to
switching to/from non-PT modes (or not travel), the general expecta-
tion is for unconditional elasticities to be larger, in absolute terms, than
conditional elasticities. A big increase in, say, the singe ticket price will
typically lead to large change in market shares of different ticket types,
i.e. a large unconditional demand elasticity, but have less effect on
overall PT demand. Most usually in the own-elasticity literature, elas-
ticities of demand refer to changes that are conditional upon an attri-
bute change of the same magnitude that applies to all PT modes or fare
types. However, and in contrast to this, the focus in this paper is largely
on unconditional elasticities, since cross-elasticity of demand between
PT modes by definition relies on changes in attributes of one PT mode
only.
Based on this background, the purpose of this paper is to present
and analyse existing evidence of cross elasticities of demand between
PT modes in particular in urban areas. In doing so, we seek to lay the
foundation for improved understanding of the dynamics of demand
between different PT modes. The potential benefits and beneficiaries of
this paper are many, as described above, although this paper is pri-
marily motivated by a genuine curiosity and a deep interest in pas-
senger transport demand, which these co-authors have shared for years
(see, e.g., Fearnley et al., 2017).
When studying cross elasticities of demand between PT modes,
there is an obvious question whether in fact PT modes operate parallel
routes in such a way that there occurs real competition between them.
There is great variation between cities and countries in this respect. The
‘traditional’ planning paradigm would oppose operations of parallel
services, e.g. of bus and rail, so as to minimise cannibalism and to
promote the different modes' scale economies. Such duplication of ex-
pensive resources would be regarded as wasteful. From this perspective,
different PT modes serve different markets and competition between
those modes is very limited. An alternative view would be that in any
sizable city with more than one PT mode in operation with a reasonable
service network, there would usually be several alternative PT routes
and modes between most OD pairs and therefore there may be con-
siderable competition between those PT modes and routes. A typical
example would be transit services between a city centre and its airport.
Additionally, different public transport modes may offer different trade-
offs between service attributes (e.g. time and money), such that if tra-
vellers have different preferences, it may even be efficient to run par-
allel services with different service attributes. From this perspective, it
is of relevance to investigate outcomes of changes to one of the alter-
native PT modes on all other PT modes.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the process of identifying data and provides an overview of the
sources of evidence that goes onto the analysis. Section 3 presents and
analyses the data, while section 4 discusses the findings and draws
conclusions and their policy implications.
2. Method and data
This review brings together evidence from a wide range of
sources. The library search includes resources such as ISI, Google
Scholar, World Transit Research database, Bureau of Infrastructure,
Transport and Regional Economics (BITRE) Elasticities Database
Online, Springer Link, ScienceDirect, and Tylor and Francis Online.
Search terms typically consisted of combinations of (transport* or
travel or passenger), cross, elasticit*, demand, (transit or bus or
public transport or rail or tram or metro or LRT or BRT), (urban or
city or local), and so on. Additionally, we contacted, directly, a
number of colleagues across the globe, who were considered likely to
either hold unpublished material or to help us point to important
pieces of work in this area.
This exercise resulted in the identification of 20 different sources
of literature. Of these, 15 were primary sources and 5 secondary
(cited) sources. From this sample of 20 references, 174 different
cross-elasticity estimates between PT modes are recorded. To our
knowledge, this is the largest data set of cross elasticity evidence
between public transport modes ever assembled and analysed.
Although our focus is on local transit, we included a few notable
contributions that refer to intercity transport and longer distance
trips. Each source has been coded into a spreadsheet table with in-
formation about location, year, study type, data type, method, esti-
mated cross elasticity estimate, and so on.
2 For example, the UK recommended own-price elasticity of demand for bus changed
from −0.3 to −0.4 between 1980 and 2004 (Balcombe et al., 2004; Webster and Bly,
1980). The Norwegian recommended value is −0.4 (Norheim & Ruud, 2007) and Litman
(2017) global review concludes that short run transit fare elasticities are typically in the
region of −0.2 to −0.5.
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As demonstrated in equation (1), the relative market share, Q
Q
j
i
, is
highly significant explanator of cross-elasticity results. Much effort has
therefore been invested in this variable during data collection. For 124
observations (71% of the total), relative market shares were in fact
reported in the cited sources. For the remaining observations, we first
contacted corresponding authors. This yielded another 31 observations
(18%) of market shares from a first source. Four more relative market
shares (2%) were retrieved from EPOMM's Modal Split Details3 and
Australian Government's Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and
Fig. 1. Transit Mode Share of Total Transit Demand in Selected World Cities and for World Regions of Cities. Source: Analysis of UITP 2001, 2015 data.
3 http://www.epomm.eu/tems/result_cities.phtml?more=1.
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Regional Economics' (BITRE) Urban passenger transport statistics. For
the remaining 15 observations (9%), an expert inquiry was undertaken,
in which three of the co-authors and two external experts provided their
educated guestimate of market shares for the two modes in question for
each cross-elasticity estimate, based on the available background in-
formation (year, location, trip purpose, etc.). For each of these guest-
imates the experts would indicate the certainty of their guestimate. This
certainty score was used to calculate weighted average likely mode
shares for each observation.
Table 1 presents the 20 sources and which cross elasticity relations
they cover, while Table 2 presents some key characteristics of these
sources.
3. Empirical evidence and meta-analysis
3.1. Overall tendencies
Table 3 shows the assembled values for internal transit mode cross
elasticities under the separate policy change headings of fares, in-ve-
hicle journey time, wait time, access/egress time and number of in-
terchanges. Values shown are the average of cross elasticity evidence
assembled with min/max values also shown. Sub-section 3.2 provides a
statistical analysis of these observations, and performs significance
tests.
Some 174 separate values were assembled. Most (76) related to fare
change evidence followed by cases where in-vehicle travel time had
been adjusted (53). Most evidence concerned changes in transit modes
which affected rail demand (80) and bus demand (78). Few cases of
metro and light rail demand impacts have been documented. Metro
cases only considered changes in fares between transit modes.
All values in Table 3 are positive as would be expected, since all at-
tributes in question are ‘bads’ (cost, time, interchanges, hassle). It means
that an increase in these attributes for one PT mode will, all else equal,
make it less attractive and thereby increase demand for other PT modes.
Average transit cross elasticity values ranged from a minimum of
0.01 to a maximum of 0.48. The highest average value of 0.48 was for
bus demand impacted by changes in in-vehicle journey time by rail. The
implication is that, all other things being equal, a 10% reduction in
journey time by rail would act to reduce bus demand by 4.8%. The
second highest average value is 0.38 for bus demand being impacted by
changes in access/egress and transfer time on light rail. The implication
is a 10% reduction in light rail access/egress and transfer time would
reduce bus demand by 3.8%.
In general, rail demand is less elastic (or stickier) to changes in bus
than bus demand is to changes in rail. For example, a 10% fare decrease
on rail relative to bus decreases bus demand by 2.8% (εij = 0.28) while
a 10% relative decrease in fares by bus acts to decrease rail demand by
only 1.5% (εij = 0.15). This pattern is apparent for almost all policy
variables. Interestingly it does not follow for the number of inter-
changes; εij = 0.03 for the number of rail interchanges impacting on
bus demand, but is a massive 0.24 for bus impacting on rail demand.
The implication is that a 10% decrease in the number of interchanges
by rail acts to decrease bus demand by 0.3% but a 10% decrease in bus
interchange acts to decrease rail demand by 2.4%. However, only a
single set of data points is behind this evidence so this result must be
taken with a good degree of caution.
The lowest average cross elasticity values in Table 3 concern
changes in policy variables for rail and their impact on light rail (fares,
in-vehicle journey time, wait time and interchanges) and for changes in
light rail wait time impacting rail demand. We can conclude from this
that heavy and light rail system demands are relatively insensitive to
each other while bus demand is much more sensitive to rail and heavy
rail. Metro is also quite insensitive to rail but again there is not much
evidence to go on from available sources.
By mode, bus demand is most sensitive to rail in-vehicle travel time
(εij = 0.48), light rail access/egress/transfer time (εij = 0.38) and rail
wait time (εij = 0.22). Bus demand is most insensitive to rail inter-
change (εij = 0.03) and light rail wait time (εij = 0.05). However, for all
low values of elasticities there are commonly few data points.
Rail demand is most sensitive to bus in-vehicle time (e εij = 0.26),
bus interchange (εij = 0.24) followed by bus fare (εij = 0.15). Rail de-
mand is least sensitive to light rail wait time (εij = 0.01), light rail fare
(εij = 0.02) followed by light rail interchange and in-vehicle time
(εij = 0.06).
Light rail demand is most sensitive to bus interchange (εij = 0.23)
and bus fare (εij = 0.21) followed by bus in-vehicle time (εij = 0.15).
Light rail demand is less sensitive to almost all rail based policy mea-
sures. However, for all light rail demand related values except bus fare,
there is only a single point of evidence for each case.
Metro demand data is only available for changes in bus and rail
fares. Metro demand is most sensitive to bus fare (εij = 0.21) and least
to rail fare (0.10) however again there are only single data points of
evidence available for each case.
The minimum and maximum values in Table 3 illustrate the range
of values found in the review. The highest maximum values found are
above 1.00 and all relate to bus demand affected by changes in rail fares
(εij max=1.31), rail in-vehicle travel time (εij max= 1.09) and rail
wait time (εij max= 1.00). Maximum values of this scale emphasise
Table 1
References in database and cross-PT-modal relations covered. (Demand for first
mentioned mode with respect to last mode. E.g. “bus-rail” means demand for
bus with respect to change in a rail attribute.)
Reference No. and source Demand relations covered
1. Dargay, Clark, Johnson, Toner, and
Wardman (2010)
Bus-rail; rail-bus
2. Dargay (2010) Bus-rail; rail-bus
3. Douglas, Franzmann, and Frost
(2003)
Bus-rail; rail-bus
4. Fairhurst and Morris (1975) LRT-bus
5. Flügel, Caspersen, Angell, Fearnley,
and Kwong (2015)
Bus-rail; LRT/metro-bus; LRT/metro-
rail; rail-LRT/metro; bus-LRT
6. Glaister and Lewis (1997) Bus-rail; LRT-bus; bus-LRT
7. Mackett and Bird (1989) Bus-rail
8. Mc Fadden (1974) Bus-rail; rail-bus; LRT-bus
9. MVA (1996) Bus-rail; rail-bus
10. MVA (2008) Rail-bus
11. Oscar Faber TPA (1993) Bus-rail; rail-bus
12. Rich and Mabit (2011) Bus-rail; rail-bus
13. Rohr et al. (2013) Bus-rail
14. Steer Davies Gleave (1996) Bus-rail; metro-rail; bus-metro; metro-
bus
15. Talvitie (1973, cited in Lago et al.
1981)
Bus-rail; rail-bus
16. Taplin, Hensher, and Smith (1999) Bus-rail; rail-bus
17. Toner and Wardman (1993) Bus-rail; rail-bus
18. Wardman (1993) Rail-bus
19. Wardman (1992) Rail-bus
20. Wardman and Whelan (1995) Rail-bus
Table 2
Characteristics of sample, N= 20. “na” typically refers to secondary sources.
Publication type 6 published report; 5 journal/book; 4 unpublished
academic; 2 conference paper; 2 thesis; 1 other
Country/region covered 13 UK/GB; 1 Norway; 2 Australia; 2 USA; 1 Scotland; 1
Europe
General method 9 predicting with choice model; 4 regression model; 2
deduced; 2 transport model; 3 other/na
RP/SP 12 RP; 3 SP; 3 RP-SP; 2 other/na
Type of data 9 cross sectional; 4 time series; 3 pseudo panel/SP; 4
other/na
Level 4 national; 9 urban; 1 international; 2 station-to-
station flow; 4 other/na
Location 9 urban; 7 interurban; 4 long distance
Year of publication 3 before 1980; 1 1980–89; 9 1990–99; 2 2000–09; 5
2010 and later
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how bus demand is sensitive to changes rail design but again caution is
warranted since only a few data points are available in the evidence;
values of this scale certainly represent extremes of experience – e.g.
caused by extreme relative market shares.
Fig. 2 illustrates the relative average values of cross modal internal
transit elasticities by mode of demand affected (rail, bus, light rail and
metro). This illustrates the imbalance of changes in rail based modes on
bus demand vs changes in bus on rail demand; bus demand has the
highest cross elasticities notably for rail in-vehicle time as related
above. Bus demand is also highly sensitive to light rail access/egress
and transfer time. Rail demand is more influenced by bus in-vehicle
time and the number of interchanges. Light rail demand is more in-
fluenced by the number of bus interchanges. All other patterns have
quite small cross modal elasticity effects (εij < 0.2).
3.2. Statistical analysis
In this section, we present a regression model on the cross-elasti-
cities identified in the literature study, i.e. we perform a formal meta-
analysis, a methodological approach that is widely applied in trans-
portation research (Holmgren, 2007; Melo, Graham, & Brage-Ardao,
2013; Wardman, 2014).
The motivation in our case is threefold: 1) we want to test if the
general patterns observed and discussed in the previous section are
retained after controlling for market shares and the applied method 2)
we want to measure the effect and test for statistical significance of
Table 3
Summary of internal cross-modal transit elasticities assembled from the research literature & practice review.
Demand for With respect
to
Change in Policy Variable
Fare VT/journey time Wait time headway Access/egress/transfer time No. of interchanges
N Mean Min Max N Mean Min Max N Mean Min Max N Mean Min Max N Mean Min Max
Light rail Bus 5 0.21 0.11 0.28 1 0.15 0.15 0.15 1 0.06 0.06 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.03 1 0.23 0.23 0.23
Rail 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 1 0.06 0.06 0.06 1 0.01 0.01 0.01
Bus Light rail 3 0.16 0.10 0.25 1 0.15 0.15 0.15 1 0.05 0.05 0.05 2 0.38 0.38 0.38 1 0.17 0.17 0.17
Rail 31 0.28 0.02 1.31 23 0.48 0.03 1.09 9 0.22 0.03 1.00 5 0.15 0.03 0.34 1 0.03 0.03 0.03
Metro 1 0.16 0.16 0.16
Rail Light rail 1 0.02 0.02 0.02 1 0.06 0.06 0.06 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 2 0.11 0.11 0.11 1 0.06 0.06 0.06
Bus 32 0.15 0.01 0.49 26 0.26 0.02 0.91 12 0.08 0.03 0.18 3 0.13 0.04 0.25 1 0.24 0.24 0.24
Metro Bus 1 0.21 0.21 0.21
Rail 1 0.10 0.10 0.10
Fig. 2. Average Internal Transit Cross Modal Elasticities - Mode Affected and Mode Changed – 5 types of policy change.
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factors affecting cross-elasticities 3) we want to present a simple model
that may be used to predict cross-elasticities in scenarios where data is
lacking.
Cases involving metro are excluded from this analysis because of the
low number of observation regarding that transport mode.
The presented model is mathematically given as:
= + + + + + += = = =CE ec D D D D ln RMS( )mM m m aA a a cC c c dD d d rms1 1 1 1
Where;
• CE > 0 is the cross-elasticity identified by the literature study.• c is the constant term.• Dm are dummy variables identifying the mode combination of af-
fected x altered mode. m are the corresponding parameters.• Da are dummy variables identifying the underlying attribute. a are
the corresponding parameters.• Dc are dummy variables identifying the country/continent. c are
the corresponding parameters.• DD are dummy variables identifying the type of dataset (RP, SP or
combined RP-SP). d are the corresponding parameters.• RMS>0 is the relative market share of the altered mode compared
to the affected mode This variable is log-transformed which helps
interpretation. rms is the corresponding parameter.• is an IID-normally distributed error term.
The specification as a log-transformed model is supported by tests
we performed indicating heteroscedasticity and detected hetero-
scedasticity. After a log-transformation the model constitutes a linear
regression models that can be estimated with the standard least square
method. The beta-parameters measure the relative effect (percent
change) of the covariate on the cross-elasticity compared to the nor-
malised level. The reference categories are m=Rail× Bus, a= fare,
c=Australia, d=RP. Note that ec (i.e. e to the power of c, or exp(c)) is
the cross elasticity of normalised level, provided that the altered and
affected mode have the same market shares (RMS=1). Table 4 pre-
sents model estimates.
To ease interpretation of the model, regard a situation where we are
interested in predicting the cross-elasticity of changes in train headway
on the demand for buses in a (hypothetical) Norwegian study based on
SP-data. Assuming the relative market share of train compared to buss
to be 0.5, the cross elasticity is then calculated as:=+ + +e * 0.08942.433 0.138 0.442 0.0629 0.703 0.459 ln(0.5)
Taking a closer look at the parameter estimates, we see that cross-
elasticities between light-rail and train are significantly lower than
between rail and bus. This might be intuitive given that light train and
train do seldom share the same market (light train seldom operates on
long distances) while buss services are a closer substitute to train given
that the also operate on longer distances. This is in line with the overall
tendency found in the previous section.
The parameter estimates give a strong indication for that in-vehicle
time has a stronger demand effect than fares, given the significant po-
sitive parameter on the cross-elasticity. The results suggest that in-ve-
hicle time implies a 46,7% higher cross-elasticities than fares.
Headway/waiting time yields lower cross-elasticities than fares (and in-
vehicle time).
There seems to be an indication for that studies from the UK pro-
duce higher estimates compared to Australia (and Europe/Norway).
This finding is hard to interpret without going deeper into the material
– which is outside of the scope of this paper.
The relative market share has – as expected – a high and statically
significant effect on cross-elasticities. A 1% change in this variable leads
to 0.459% higher cross-elasticity.
Finally, we find evidence for that SP studies predict the highest
cross-elasticities; significantly higher than RP-studies (and combined
RP-SP studies). Although the analysis relies on only three studies that
use SP data, this is an interesting finding from a methodological point of
view and seems to be in line with caveats of using SP studies for de-
mand studies because of the inherent hypothetical bias attached to SP-
studies (Hensher & Li, 2010).
4. Discussion and conclusions
Although we are unaware of any review studies or meta-analysis
that has gathered the amount of evidence of cross elasticities of demand
between transit modes which is presented in this paper, we are still left
with a mere 20 references and 174 cross elasticity estimates. This
limited amount of evidence is an indication of a knowledge gap, which
would be useful to fill. For the purposes of our meta-analysis, however,
the main implication of the limited amount of evidence is the fact that,
when broken down by different modal pairs and attributes, most cross
elasticity relations estimated are based on few observations (N). The
only cross elasticity evidence with a considerable amount of evidence
(N > 10), refers to combinations between bus and rail and for changes
in fares, travel time and headway. For the remaining cross elasticity
relations, available evidence is extremely scarce in the literature. This
means that the evidence and findings of this paper must be treated with
a great amount of caution. Adding to that, cross elasticities are parti-
cularly context dependent. Therefore, this compilation of evidence from
across the globe brings in additional uncertainty that should be kept in
mind, even when the statistical analysis has controlled for contextual
variables including study location.
Having regards to these caveats, the review and meta-analysis
identifies a few moderately robust insights.
One is that competition between rail and LRT is almost non-existing.
Bus, on the other side, appears to compete with both rail on longer trips
and light rail on shorter trips. The implication is that, where rail modes
seek to attract more passengers (as in Oslo) or where the demand for
Table 4
Linear regression. Dependent variable: LN(Estimated cross elasticity). “Affected
mode×Altered mode” is interpreted as demand for affected mode with respect
to an attribute change of the altered mode.
Coefficient SE
Affected mode×Altered mode
Light rail× Bus 0.142 0.351
Light rail×Rail −1.442a 0.466
Bus× Light Rail 0.511 0.376
Bus×Rail 0.138 0.174
Rail× Light Rail −1.117** 0.454
Rail× Bus Ref
Attribute
Fare Ref
In-vehicle/journey time 0.467a 0.163
Waiting time/headway −0.442** 0.217
Access/egress/transfer time 0.245 0.283
No. of interchanges 0.191 0.417
Country
Australia Ref
Europe −0.671 0.42
Norway −0.0629 0.368
US 0.48 0.382
United Kingdom 0.477** 0.235
LN(Relative market share) 0.459a 0.0776
RPSP RP Ref
SP 0.703** 0.283
Combined −0.00486 0.19
Constant −2.433a 0.296
Observations 171
R-squared 0.482
Adjusted R-squared 0.428
Log Likelihood −210.8
a p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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rail modes is exceeding rail capacity (as may be the case in London),
bus is likely the most relevant alternative mode, which passengers
would be diverted from (Oslo) or to (London), respectively.
Another is the fact that travel time seems to be the most important
aspect of inter-modal competition, followed by fare, access/egress/
transfer time, and number of interchanges. Interestingly, waiting time
comes out as the attribute with the lowest cross elasticity, when cor-
recting for other aspects of the study. Although this finding may be
uncertain due to few observations, it may be related to the amount each
of these attributes add to passengers’ Generalised Costs (GC). Since our
data primarily refers to urban transport, where service frequencies in
general are likely to be high, waiting time may add less to GC than
travel time and fares do. The policy implication is to focus on travel
time differences between PT modes, if the goal is to shift passengers
between PT modes. However, the extent to which travel times are in
fact possible to change significantly on a system level, is a question for
debate. One may argue that relative prices (i.e. fares) are easier to
change, despite their potential political (and budgetary) costs.
A third is related to study area and methods applied. UK studies
report much higher cross elasticities than studies from other countries
and continents, all else equal, as do stated preference studies. There is
not enough information in the data to investigate this further, but fu-
ture studies should scrutinise these preliminary findings.
Fourth, we find statistical support for the theoretical argument that
market shares play important role for the magnitude of cross elasti-
cities. The finding is reassuring and, indeed, it helps cast some con-
fidence on the statistical meta-analysis.
The cross modal internal demand effects presented in this paper are
caused by a number of likely influences; these are hypothesised below.
1. The relative scale of transit mode – Separate transit modes almost
always have a different scale of coverage of cities with bus services
generally dominating and light rail and metros representing a
smaller share of metropolitan area wide service area coverage and
ridership. There are exceptions to this generalisation but in general,
bus services tend to dominate at least in spatial network coverage
terms in cities. It follows that the scale of change in bus policy
measures (fares, level of service etc.) would thus dominate demand
effects of rail based modes compared to rail mode effects. However,
this only works if bus competes with rail directly for the same
market and that they serve similar catchment areas. Regarding this,
Flügel, Fearnley, and Toner (2018) found that the number of
available travel alternatives each traveller has, significantly affects
diversion factors, which again are key determinants of cross-elasti-
cities. In practice, rail is a longer distance mode and bus less so. In
our data, rail policy changes tended to have much greater market
effects than bus did on rail markets. The implication is that despite
bus markets, in general, being bigger, they don't compete for the
same market. Hence, rail is somewhat protected from changes in bus
policy but bus is more sensitive to changes in rail policy. So there
appears to be more to relative market competition than just relative
market size.
2. The relative scale of own mode walk access vs. cross mode
feeder transfer demand – If the market for a transit mode involves
almost entirely walk on access/egress then cross elasticity transit
elasticities should be smaller than for modes with high shares of
ridership making interchanges from other transit modes. While this
hypothesis seems logical we doubt there are any clear patterns of
ridership in cities where specific modes have more or less inter-
transit transfer shares than others. Rail has strong walk on ridership,
but bus feeder to and from rail is also dominant in many cities, and
this effect would act to influence both bus and rail. We also see no
clear patterns in the cross-elasticity results which can prove or dis-
prove this hypothesis. In practice, actual effects will vary in the real
world by variations in circumstances between cities.
3. Effects of near catchment competition between transit modes –
In general, close spatial proximity between the alignments and
stops/stations of transit modes should act to increase cross modal
market effects. The inverse of this effect is that modes with spatially
segregated alignments, located well away from other modes, should
have smaller cross modal demand effects. As mentioned in section 1,
it is a core principal of integrated network planning of transit sys-
tems that transit modes work together to achieve a wider spatial
distribution of services and that wasteful competition and overlap of
routes is avoided. Key to this principle is that rail modes, due to
their high cost, are protected from competition from nearby bus
routes. On this basis we might expect rail, light rail and metro de-
mand to display much lower demand elasticities than bus and in-
deed this is the dominant picture of the results displayed (Table 3
and Fig. 2). Another example of this principle is that light rail and
rail in particular are rarely spatially adjacent in the real world due
to the high costs of construction and operation. This suggests in-
teraction between rail and light rail markets would be small. This is
indeed also supported by the cross-elasticity results presented.
However, the real world is a complex place and area-wide network
integration has not been achieved in all cities; it also varies in
quality within cities. Indeed, commercial competition occurs in
places and this might act to dampen the transit mode effects hy-
pothesised above. We also note that ‘Force feeding’ of ridership to
rail (metro and light rail) stations from bus is also undertaken to
achieve the same network integration objective and this might act to
counteract cross modal effects since as noted above (point 2), cross
transit mode feeding can act to increase cross modal demand sen-
sitivity.
4. Crowding levels affect transit mode choice – We have already
argued that crowding is one possible policy reason for shifting de-
mand from rail to bus – or the other way around. However,
crowding directly impacts the generalised cost of different transit
modes such that less crowding is more attractive than more
crowding. In this way, crowding affects mode choice. All else equal,
the less crowded mode would be preferred. Crowding levels of dif-
ferent modes would indeed differ within areas as well as between
areas and cities. Ideally, therefore, our studies should have included
information about levels of crowding. Unfortunately, this is not the
case. Beyond the fact that crowding itself causes modal shift, we can
only speculate that, for example, crowding plays a role in causing
the high cross elasticities observed in UK studies, where crowding is
more of a problem, relative to countries like Norway, where on-
board crowding is less of a problem.
Overall, the cross modal internal transit mode elasticities assembled
in this research represent one of the first times that this subject has been
explored in any depth. There are clearly large gaps in evidence and
future research should seek to fill these. While this meta-study has only
scratched the surface, it would be useful to explore further the factors
causing the variations in patterns of cross transit modal demand effects
discovered in future research. A point worth noting for future research
is the fact that, as opposed to cross-elasticities, diversion factors are
independent of the relative market shares of the altered mode – at least
as a first-order effect – and can therefore be expected to be more stable
across studies (Wallis, 2004) and more transferable (BAH, 2003). Flügel
et al., 2018 produced a scatter-plot which illustrates how cross-elasti-
cities are more influenced by relative market shares than diversion
factors are. As a central element to the cross-elasticity equation (1),
better understanding of diversion factors stand out as low-hanging, and
important, fruit for gaining further insights into cross-modal demand
dynamics. Despite the gaps in evidence found in this review it has
provided a range of insights into cross transit modal demand effects
which should prove of value to planners, policy makers and industry
stakeholders into the future.
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